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Crime, Punishment, and Causation: The Effect of Etiological Information
on the Perception of Moral Agency
Philip Robbins and Paul Litton
University of Missouri

Moral judgments about a situation are profoundly shaped by the perception of individuals in that situation
as either moral agents or moral patients (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray, Young, & Waytz. 2012),
Specifically, the more we see someone as a moral agent, the less we see them as a moral patient, and vice
versa. As a result, casting the perpetrator of a transgression as a victim tends to have the effect of making

them seem less blameworthy (Gray & Wegner, 201 1). Based on this theoretical framework, we predicted
that criminal offenders with a mental disorder that predisposes them to antisocial behavior would be

judged

more negatively when the disorder is described as having a genetic origin than when it is
described as environmentally caused, as in the case of childhood abuse or accident. Further, we predicted

that some environmental explanations would mitigate attributions of blame more than others, namely,
that offenders whose disorder was caused by childhood abuse (intentional harm) would be seen as less
blameworthy than offenders whose disorder is caused by an unfortunate accident (unintentional harm).
Results from two vignette-based studies designed to test these predictions, conducted with participants
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 244 and N = 387, respectively), confirmed the first

prediction but not the second. Implications of this research for three areas-the psychology of moral
judgment, philosophical debates about moral responsibility and determinism, and the practice of the

law

are discussed in the sequel.

Keywords: moral typecasting, blame, punishment, responsibility, causation

On July 5, 1978, Robert Alton Harris and his brother spotted
two teenage boys eating in the parking lot of a fast food restaurant.
Harris forced them into their car at gunpoint and ordered one of
them to drive. After stopping and ordering them out of the car,
Harris shot one boy in the back, then chased down the other boy
and shot him several times. Upon returning to the car, Harris found
his first victim still alive and shot him in the head. Afterward,
Harris and his brother finished eating the hamburgers that the boys
had bought, and then used their car to rob a bank. Arrested and
charged with multiple counts of first-degree murder, Harris was
found guilty at trial and sentenced to death.
Harris' monstrous behavior might be causally explained on a
variety of levels. At least in principle we could explain his conduct
and traits physiologically, in terms of abnormalities of brain chemistry and structure. This would be a proximal causal explanation.
Facts about his genetic profile could also contribute to a more

distal causal story at the physiological level, explaining why his
brain failed to develop normally. Alternatively, we might explain
his wrongdoing in environmental terms, pointing to the horrific
abuse and neglect that Harris suffered as a child. Indeed, expert
witnesses described his childhood as a "prisoner-of-war-camp"
and his experiences as "a 9 on a Richter scale for traumatic stress"
(Gross, 1990). A third possibility would be to explain Harris's
behavior in terms of an interaction between genetic and environmental factors. Individuals with the so-called warrior gene
(MAOA-L) who have been abused as children, for example, appear to be predisposed to violent behavior, and Harris may have
been such an individual (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006; Tiihonen
et al., 2015).
Are physiological or environmental explanations relevant to
determining Harris's culpability for his crimes? Aside from this
puzzling philosophical question, it is important to know whether
people generally find such explanations relevant to blame and
punishment. Accordingly, empirical researchers have investigated
the extent to which such causal explanations influence ordinary
intuitions about appropriate punishment. With scientific knowledge advancing with respect to the causes of antisocial conduct, it
should be helpful to lawyers and lawmakers to know the extent to
which such evidence may affect judges and juries. Empirical
research into the effect of causal explanations on judgments of
blameworthiness, moral responsibility, and appropriate punishment could have practical importance for criminal lawyers as well
as for courts assessing the obligations of counsel.
Such research is relevant to philosophical inquiry as well. Philosophers working on issues surrounding free will and moral
responsibility appeal to ordinary intuitions to support their argu-

This article was published Online First September 21, 2017.
Philip Robbins, Department of Philosophy. University of Missouri: Paul
Litton, School of Law, University of Missouri.
Portions of the research reported in this article were presented at the
annual Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, NY, September 2016, and at the annual conference of the Southern Society for

Philosophy and Psychology, Savannah, GA. March. 2017. We thank Ted
Bach, Kurt Gray. Joshua Knobe, and Eddy Nahmias for helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Philip
Robbins, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Strickland
Hall 426, Columbia, MO 65211. E-mail: robbinsp@nmissouri.edu
118

(RIMI., PUiNISHMINvt. AND) CAt'S.A
ments. Incompatibilists, for example. describe cases in which a
hypothetical agent would not be deemed morally responsible by
ordinary intuitions, and then argue that the best explanation for the
intuition is that the agent's conduct was causally determined.
Imagine for the moment that ordinary intuitions find genetic explanations of an agent's criminal behavior to undermine their
moral responsibility. A natural interpretation of this hypothetical
intuition is that genetic explanations mitigate because the offender's genes, which are outside his control, caused his violence. If
that interpretation is correct, then incompatibilists can make inroads with what Moore (1997) calls the "beachhead challenge."
The incompatibilist points to an excuse we accept within our moral
practices and shows that its rationale is based on causation by
events outside an agent's control. If we accept one excuse (the
argument's "beachhead") based on causation by factors outside an
agent's control, and if determinism is true, then the excuse should
generalize to eliminate responsibility entirely-because if determinism is true, all conduct is caused by factors outside our control.
If we find offenders less than fully responsible when their behavior
is given a genetic explanation, then the incompatibilist can latch
onto that beachhead; at the very least, the argument would go, we
find causation to diminish an agent's responsibility. To deny the
beachhead, the compatibilist must either deny that a genetic explanation can diminish responsibility or provide a compatibilist
rationale for the intuition that it can. The same point applies to
other kinds of causal explanation, whether at the physiological or
environmental level, which might influence our intuitions about
responsibility.
To proceed along this path, however, we need to have more than
an armchair sense of the candidates for incompatibilist beachheads. Perhaps some kinds of causal explanation affect our intuitions about responsibility but others do not. For example, if
intuitions about responsibility are unaffected by genetic explanations of wrongdoing, then compatibilists need not worry about
explaining such cases; but if intuitions find environmental causes
of wrongdoing to mitigate responsibility, then compatibilists will
need to either offer a compatibilist-friendly justification for those
intuitions or explain them away. To explore these possibilities,
though, we must first systematically investigate what ordinary
intuitions say about such cases.
A natural starting point for this investigation is empirical research on the general structure of moral cognition. Of particular
relevance to our project is the Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM),
which posits a single cognitive template underlying all moral
judgments (Gray & Wegner, 2009, 2011; Gray, Young, & Waytz,
2012; Schein & Gray, 2017). According to TDM, moral judgments
about a situation are profoundly shaped by the perception of
individuals in that situation as either moral agents or moral patients. By definition, a moral agent has the capacity to perform
morally good or bad actions, whereas a moral patient has the
capacity to be on the receiving end of such actions. The conceptual
dichotomy between agency and patiency is governed by the principle of "moral typecasting": The more we see someone as a moral
agent, the less we see them as a moral patient, and vice versa. In
other words, moral agency and moral patiency are antithetical
roles, and moral actors tend to be cast in one role to the exclusion
of the other, even across contexts. For example, casting the perpetrator of a transgression as a victim of harm tends to have the
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effect of making them seem less blameworthy (Gray & Wegner,
201 1).
In the present context, the significance of'I NI as an account of
moral cognition is largely because of the fact that it generates clear
predictions about how etiological information will influence the
way people think about criminal behasior. According to the theory, we should expect that criminal offenders with a mental disorder that predisposes them to violent antisocial behavior will be
judged more negatively when the disorder is described as having a
genetic origin than when it is described as environmentally caused,
as in the case of childhood abuse or accident. The basis of this
prediction is as follows. When the disorder has an environmental
origin, there is a preexisting person who has suffered harm; hence,
the perception of their moral patiency should be heightened, and
the perception of their moral agency attenuated, by the addition of
etiological information. When the disorder has a genetic origin, by
contrast, there is no preexisting person to whom harm has been
done (because no person exists before the determination of their
genetic profile), so the perception of their moral agency should be
unaffected by the receipt of information about the cause of their
pathology. In other words, offenders whose disorder arises from
environmental causes should be seen as less blameworthy than
offenders whose disorder is caused by bad genes, because the
former will be seen as victims but the latter will not. Moreover,
genetic explanations of psychopathology, insofar as they do not
implicate personal harm or victimhood, should not affect the
perception of moral agency.
Most of the evidence gathered to date concerning the effects of
causal explanations on moral judgment in the context of criminal
law is consistent with the account sketched above. That said, some
caveats are in order, especially with respect to the issue of whether
environmental explanations that clearly implicate victimhood,
such as a history of childhood abuse, have a mitigating effect.
Consider first the issue of whether genetic explanations of
criminal behavior mitigate judgments of blame, punishment, and
responsibility. One study, using state trial court judges as participants, investigated whether a neurogenetic explanation of an offender's psychopathy would affect judgments of responsibility and
punishment (Aspinwall, Brown, & Tabery, 2012). All participants
read a vignette involving an aggravated battery by an offender
given a diagnosis of psychopathy by a psychiatrist providing
expert testimony on the case. Half the participants then read
additional expert testimony by a neurobiologist, to the effect that
the offender's psychopathy resulted from a genetic defect linked to
abnormal development of brain structures involved in emotion
processing. The addition of this explanation significantly reduced
both the extent to which psychopathy was rated as aggravating and
the severity of sentencing, contrary to what TDM predicts. It is
possible, however, that the mitigating effect of the neurogenetic
explanation observed in this study was due to the addition of
information about the neurological basis of the offender's disorder
rather than information about its genetic origin.
More recent studies on the effect of genetic information on the
perception of moral agency, however, suggest that genetic explanations have no mitigating effect. Using a vignette in which the
protagonist committed an impulsive homicide, Appelbaum,
Scurich, and Raad (2015) found no evidence that the introduction
of genetic evidence influenced judgments about the offender's
culpability or appropriate punishment, though it did increase par-
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ticipants' fear of the defendant. Results from a related study using
vignettes involving less serious offenses exhibited a similar pattern
(Scurich & Appelbaum. 2016). These findings are consistent with
other research. Cheung and Heine (2015) found no significant
difference in sentencing because of genetic explanations of criminal behavior, despite the fact that genetic explanations reduced
perceptions of the agent's control over his conduct and increased
concerns about his future dangerousness. Fuss, Dressing, and
Briken (2015) reached similar conclusions in a study of German
judges. They found that genetic evidence did not significantly
affect the judges' estimates of appropriate punishment, though it
reduced the judges' estimation of the offender's legal responsibility. The genetic evidence, however, did raise the odds that a judge
would order involuntary commitment, again suggesting that genetic evidence influences judgments of future dangerousness.
Judging from the totality of evidence, it appears that genetic
explanations of criminal behavior do not attenuate perceptions of
the offender's moral agency. This general pattern of findings is
consistent with TDM, on the assumption that explanations of this
type do not promote the perception of mentally disordered offenders as victims of harm.
As to whether environmental explanations of behavior attenuate
the perception of moral agency, as TDM predicts, the evidence is
more mixed. Results from an early study of sentencing in capital
cases found that mock jurors were less likely to support a death
sentence for a defendant who had been severely abused by his
parents as a child (Barnett, Brodsky, & Davis, 2004). These
findings were later corroborated by other studies in which the
addition of information that an offender had suffered physical or
sexual abuse in childhood had a mitigating effect on participants'
judgments of appropriate punishment (Barnett, Brodsky, & Price,
2007; Tetterton & Brodsky, 2007). In their review of the literature
on juror decision-making in capital cases, covering both mock jury
research and research based on posttrial interviews with actual
jurors, Sandys, Pruss, and Walsh (2009) concluded that defendants
who had experienced traumatic life events outside of their control
were less likely to receive a death sentence relative to defendants
for whom no mitigating evidence was presented.
Other studies, however, have yielded contrary results. Monterosso. Royzman, and Schwartz (2005) presented participants
with vignettes of antisocial conduct accompanied by either a
neurological explanation or an explanation involving childhood
abuse. They found that ratings of the offender's culpability were
significantly higher in the environmental condition. Given the lack
of a control condition in their study, it would be wrong to conclude
from this finding that the environmental explanation had no mitigating effect. The most that can be safely said is that whatever
effect the abuse explanation might have had was less than whatever effect the brain explanation might have had. More recent
studies, however, point to a stronger conclusion about the mitigating potential of environmental explanations. For example, Steven-

son, Bottoms, and Diamond (2010) examined mock jurors' discussions of evidence that a defendant suffered serious childhood
abuse and found that the most frequent kind of juror statement
about the abuse urged that it was not mitigating (indeed, some
jurors deemed it aggravating). Appelbaum and Scurich (2014)
reached similar conclusions with respect to evidence of childhood
abuse. In one study, one group of participants received no causal
explanation of the offender's impulsivity, while others received

one of three explanations: bad genes, a history of childhood abuse,
or a combination of bad genes and childhood abuse. The latter two
groups imposed longer sentences relative to the other two groups,
despite finding the defendant to be less dangerous. For some
reason, participants found the environmental explanation to be
aggravating rather than mitigating, contrary to what TDM seems to
predict.
Our project continues the investigation into factors relevant to
the assignment of blame, punishment, and responsibility in the
context of criminal law. The central question is this: In cases where
a criminal offender is known to suffer from psychopathy or a
similar psychiatric disorder, how are our ordinary judgments of
blame, punishment, and responsibility affected by what we know
about the etiology of the disorder? Our work is distinctive within
the literature on this topic in two respects. First, our vignettes
differ in potentially significant ways. Vignettes used in other
research on the impact of childhood abuse evidence tend to be
short on details, simply stating that the protagonist suffered abuse
as a child. Details might matter because of their power to make the
causal information salient by engaging participants' imagination.
To avoid this potential confound, our vignettes described in some
detail the kind of abuse our protagonist suffered.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, whereas most previous
studies have investigated ordinary intuitions without a clear theoretical framework, our hypotheses were based on a specific account of moral judgment, namely, the Theory of Dyadic Morality.
Our initial hypothesis, derived from this theory, was that ordinary
attributions of blame are reduced to a greater extent by evidence of
extreme childhood suffering than by evidence of genetic causation.
Further, we hypothesized that some environmental explanations
mitigate attributions of blame more than others. Specifically, offenders whose disorder is caused by childhood abuse are seen in a
less negative light than offenders whose disorder is caused by an
unfortunate accident. The underlying idea here is that we view
intentional harms as more serious than harms that are similar in all
relevant respects apart from being caused accidentally. For example, consider two individuals who have suffered a broken leg, one
as the result of an aggravated assault and the other as the result of
a skiing accident. Both individuals have been harmed, but the
victim of the assault has been doubly harmed, having suffered both
a physical injury and the indignity of being disrespected by a
wrongdoer. Given the greater moral significance of intentionally
caused harm, offenders with a disorder caused by deliberate mistreatment at the hands of others will be perceived more strongly as
moral patients and, accordingly, be viewed as less blameworthy
relative to offenders whose disorder was caused by accident. Our
goal in testing these hypotheses was twofold: first, to explore the
effects of etiological information on moral judgment beyond what
can be gleaned from the existing literature: and second, to assess
the predictive power of TDM as applied to the legal domain.

Study 1: Genes Versus Environment
Our first study used a 3 x 2 factorial design, with the etiology
of the agent's brain disorder (genes vs. abuse vs. accident) as the
first factor and the type of crime described in the vignette (robbery
vs. homicide) as the second factor. The main dependent variables
were attributions of blame and punishment. Attributions of free
will and "true selfhood"-that is, the extent to which an action
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expresses the aent', essential character (Newman. Bloom.
Knohe, -1014)-were also included. as additional indicators of the
effects of causal inforination on the perception of agency.
Our main prediction was the agent would he seen as deservin-,
of more blame and punishment when the etiology of, his disorder
was genetic rather than environmental. We expected that this same
pattern of contrasts would extend to the effects of etiology on the
perception of the agent's free will and true selfhood. It was also
predicted that, of the two scenarios involving an environmental
cause, the agent whose disorder resulted from intentional harm
would be viewed less unfavorably than the agent who had been
harmed accidentally.
Given the greater moral seriousness of homicide vis-a-vis robbery, it was expected that participants would judge the agent in the
homicide vignette more negatively than the agent in the robbery
vignette, and that this difference would show up in attributions of
blame and punishment. No prediction was made as to whether the
difference between types of crime would affect perceptions of free
will and true selfhood.

Method
Participants. There were 244 participants ( 6 4 %Ifemale; mean
age = 31.3 years) who were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). Potential participants were offered $0.20 to complete a brief survey of attitudes toward blame and punishment.
Recruitment was limited to individuals living in the United States
who had completed at least 50 MTurk tasks with an overall
approval rating of 9 5 1c or better. Before data collection, the study
was certified as exempt by the Institutional Review Board at the
University of Missouri.
Materials and procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned
to one of two conditions. Depending on condition, subjects read a
vignette about either an armed robbery or a homicide.2 The vignettes read as follows (italics added to indicate contrasting ma-

terial):
Brian is 22 years otd. He was recently arrested for anned robbery.
Arned with a semiautoiatic pistol, Brian entered a bonk and ordered
a teller to fill a bag with nioev. Brian grabbed the bag of nwney and
ran out ofthe bonk. A short time later, Brian was caught by the police.

Brian is 22 years old. He was recently arrested for nurder. He got into

an

argunient with a store clerk. The argument escalated and Brian
assaulted the clerk. Brian repeatedly kicked the clerk in the head after
he had fallen to fie ground, which caused his death. A short time

later, Brian was caught by the police.
In both conditions, subjects were randomly assigned to one of
three continuations of the vignette in which the agent was described as having a brain disorder marked by impairments of
empathy and moral judgment.3 These continuations differed in
terms of how the causal history of the disorder was described.
namely, whether it resulted from a genetic abnormality, a history
of childhood abuse, or an accidental brain injury.
After reading the complete vignette, subjects rated how much
blame the agent deserved for the crime (1 = no blame. 7 = a lot
of blame) and how much prison time he deserved for committing
it (0-50 years). With respect to the punishment question, participants were instructed to base their decision solely on their estimate
of how much blame the offender deserved, regardless of consid-

121

erations about his future dancrousncss and potential to reotfend.
They also indicated on a seven-point scale ( I
Atrovnt di.sagreemen. 7 - strong ugrccenrut) whether in cottmmittinc the crime the
agent exercised his free will. and on a 5-point scale I = strotg
diso r^reement. 5
strot, a 'grecmeut)
whether the crime reflected
his true self (characterized as "the deepest. most essential aspects
of his personality" (See Appendix for complete materials.)

Results
As predicted, there was a significant effect of causal information
blame. F(2. 241) = 4.94, / = .008 and punishment. F(2.
240) = 4.77,
= .009. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the
agent was seen as more blameworthy when his brain disorder had
a genetic origin than when it resulted from either childhood abuse
(p = .03, d = .39) or an accident (p = .003, d = .47) Contrary
to prediction, however. no significant difference between the two
environmental conditions was detected (abuse vs. accident, p =
.41). With respect to punishment, longer sentences were assigned
in the genetic condition relative to the abuse condition (p = .003.
d = .49), but no other significant contrasts were detected (genes
vs. accident, p = .05: abuse vs. accident, p = .28). (See Table I for
descriptive statistics.)
In addition to the effect of etiological information on blame and
punishment ratings. there was an effect of this information on
ratings of true selfhood, F(2, 241) = 3.61 p = .03 and a trend in
that direction for free will, F(2, 236) = 2.92, p = .06. In the case
of true selthood, pairwise comparisons revealed the pattern found
with blame and punishment, with ratings of true selfhood higher in
the genetic condition relative to both of the environmental conditions (genes vs. abuse, p = .02. d = .36: genes vs. accident, p =
.02, d = .37), but no significant difference between the environmental conditions (abuse vs. accident, p = .95).` In the case of free
will, pairwise comparisons showed a slightly different pattern,
with ratings of free will higher in the genetic condition relative to
the accident condition (p = .01 d = .37). but not the abuse
condition (p = .21). As elsewhere, the accident and abuse conditions did not differ significantly (p = 25).

on

Though MTurk workers as a group are more demographically diverse
than college students (Buhrmester. Kwang, & Gosling, 201 I ), they are not
perfectly representative of the population as a whole. MTurk workers in the
United States tend to he younger. more highly educated, and more computer literate than average (Ross et al., 2010). As such, they are not
perfectly representative of the communities from which jurors are typically
drawn-a fact that limits the practical significance of our results.
The homicide vignette was adapted from Monterosso, Roytman, and
Schwartz (2005).
Subsequent to data collection. all participant groups were compared on
age and gender and found to he equivalent in those respects.
4 Because of a programming error, different response scales were assigned to the free will and true self questions in Study I (7-point and
5-point, respectively). This error was corrected in Study 2.

According to Fisher's Least Significant Difference test. which holds
the family wise error rate to a = .05 in the special case of three groups, as
here (Howell 2013). All pairwise comparisons reported for Study I were
analyzed using this test.
Ratings

of true

selthood predicted blame ((3 = .49, t(241) = 6.16, p <

.0001(1 ) and pu nislhmtent ((3 =7.103. t( 24 I) - 3.58. p =.00014). contsi stet
with the possibility that the effect of causal intformattion on moral judgment
was at least partialy mediated by judgment of whether the crime expressed
the offender's true self.
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Table I
Meut Judgments in Study I

Blame

Punishment
Free will
True self
Note.

Type of crime

Cause of disorder

Tye

judgment

Genes

Abuse

Accident

Robbery

Homicide

5.81 (1.28)

5.29(l.41)
16.04 (14.90)
6.00(1.34)
3.51 (1.17)

5.10(1.74)
18.72 (16.53)
5.75(1.61)
3.50(1.11)

5.17 (1.52)
10.79 (10.70)
5.96 (1.50)
3.44(1.20)

5.63 (1.47)
28.02 (15.79)
6.06(1.26)
3.85(1.03)

23.54 (15.83)
6.27(1.13)
3.91 (1.08)

Figures in parentheses are SDs.

There was a small but significant effect of crime type on blame,
with more blame assigned to the agent in the homicide scenario
than the robbery scenario, F( I, 242) = 5.80, p = .02, d = .31. The
agent of the homicide was also judged as deserving a much longer
prison sentence than the robber. F(1. 241) = 99.09, p < .001, d =
1.28. Though the two crimes were seen as equally reflective of the
agent's free will, F(1, 237) = .31, p = .58, homicide was seen as
more expressive of the agent's true self than robbery, F(1, 242) =
8.12, p = .005, d = .37. No interaction effects between crime type
and cause were observed with any of these variables (all ps > .4).

Discussion
The principle of moral typecasting says that the more we see
someone as a moral patient (e.g., a victim), the less we see them as
a moral agent (e.g., a villain), and conversely (Gray & Wegner,
2009, 2011 ). Applied to the legal context, the principle suggests
that criminal offenders will be judged less negatively when they
are perceived as victims of harm relative to offenders who are not
so perceived. Accordingly, it predicts that an agent whose criminal
behavior is linked to psychopathology will be judged more negatively when the pathology is genetic rather than environmental in
origin, because only in the environmental case will the agent be
perceived as a victim of harm. This prediction was borne out by the
results of Study I. In two hypothetical crime scenarios, an offender
with a brain disorder was perceived as more deserving of blame
and punishment when the etiology of his disorder was genetic
rather than environmental.
The principle of moral typecasting also yields a secondary
prediction. regarding the effects of different types of harm on the
perception of moral agency. Because agents of intentional harm
tend to be seen as more deserving of blame and punishment (more
villain-like) than agents of accidental harm, it follows from the
typecasting principle that targets of intentional harm will be seen
as more deserving of sympathy and concern (more victim-like)
than targets of accidental harm. On this basis we predicted that
offenders whose pathology was caused by their having been
abused as children would be judged less negatively than offenders
whose pathology arose from an accidental brain injury. Contrary to
this prediction, offenders who had been abused were judged to be
no less deserving of blame and punishment than offenders who had
suffered an accident.
In addition to testing these predictions from the Theory of
Dyadic Morality, we explored the effects of etiological information on the perception of two other aspects of moral agency: free
will and true selfhood. The general pattern observed with respect
to these variables echoed the effects of causal information on

blame and punishment, with participants ascribing more free will
and true selfhood to the agent with a disorder of genetic origin
relative to the agent whose disorder was environmentally caused
(though in the case of free will, this contrast was statistically
significant only when the cause was accidental). As with attributions of blame and punishment, attributions of free will and true
selfhood did not vary as a function of which environmental cause
was involved.
With respect to the influence of causal information on participants' judgments, the effect sizes observed in the study were
relatively small, ranging from .36 to .49 and averaging .41. Thus,
most of the variance seen in participants' judgments of blame and
punishment cannot be traced to the effect of etiological information. Though this does not invalidate the conclusions drawn above,
it does suggest an important qualification, namely, that the power
of causal information to influence how we perceive the moral
agency of criminal offenders may be fairly modest.
The results of Study I leave open a number of issues. First, they
do not settle the question of whether the perception of moral
agency is reduced when the agent's disorder is described as having
a genetic origin-or even whether such perception is reduced by
the introduction of etiological information of any sort. Answering
this question requires the addition of a control condition in which
the causal history of the agent's disorder is not described at all (a
condition that was not included in the design of Study 1). Second,
all versions of the vignettes contained some information about the
biological basis of the agent's disorder, insofar as the disorder was
given a neurological description. No attention was paid to the
possible effect of including this information, rather than specifying
the disorder in purely psychological terms. Third, the study did not
probe perceptions of moral responsibility, an aspect of agency that
features prominently in philosophical discussions of free will. To
address these limitations, we designed and ran the follow-up study
described below.

Study 2: Genes Versus Environment
Versus no Etiology
The second study used a 4 x 2 factorial design in which both
factors were related to the etiology of a violent crime committed
by an agent with a mental disorder. Levels of the first factor
corresponded to different causal histories of the disorder (genes vs.
abuse vs. accident), plus a control condition in which no causal
history was specified. The second factor involved description of
the agent's disorder at the mechanistic level, that is, whether or not
the description included information about the neurological basis
of the disorder. The set of dependent variables from Study
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i-judgments of blame. punishment. free will, and true selhoodof moral perception. including impressions of the agent's moral responsibility for
his crime.

was

judged to deserve a longer prison

123
sentence when his disorder

was expanded to capture additional dimensions

was genetically rather than environmentally caused, but this dif-

Method

ference reached significance only relative to the accident condition
(genes vs. accident, p = .004, d = .46: genes vs. abuse. p = .13).
As before, there was no sienificant difference between the environmental conditions (abuse vs. accident, p = .64). Etiological
information was mitigating in the accident condition. but not
otherwise (accident vs. control. p = .01. d = .44: abuse vs. control.

Participants. There were 387 participants (45.57 female:
mean age = 33.9 years: 77.1% White. 4.9% Black, 5.4% Hispanic,
9.8% Asian, 2.8% other or nonreporting) who were recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Potential participants were offered
$0.25 in exchange for completing a brief survey on attitudes
toward blame and punishment. All participants were individuals
living in the United States who had completed at least 50 MTurk
tasks with an overall approval rating of 95% or better. Before data
collection, the study was certified as exempt by the Institutional
Review Board at the University of Missouri.
Materials and procedure. All participants read the homicide
vignette used in Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of eight groups.7 Participants in Groups 1-4 read that the
agent had a brain disorder involving abnormalities in the prefrontal
cortex that impaired his capacity for empathy and moral judgment.
In the first three of those groups, respectively, the vignette specified either that the brain disorder was genetic in origin, that it
resulted from childhood abuse, or that it resulted from a childhood
accident; in the fourth (control) group, there was no information
about the etiology of the disorder. Participants in Groups 5-8 read
that the agent had a psychological disorder that impaired his
capacity for empathy and moral judgment. In the first three of
these groups, respectively, participants read that the disorder was
because of either a genetic defect, childhood abuse, or a childhood
accident: in the fourth (control) group, no etiological information
was included.
After reading the vignette, participants judged how much blame
the agent deserved for his crime (1 = no blame at all, 7 = a lot of
blame) and how much prison time he should deserve (0-50 years).
They also indicated on a 5-point scale (0 = strong disagreement,
5 = strong agreement) whether the agent was fully morally
responsible for the crime, whether he deserved sympathy, and
whether there were mitigating factors in the case that reduced his
blameworthiness. Using the same scale, participants also indicated
whether the agent had acted out of free will and whether the crime
reflected his true self. (See Appendix for complete materials.)
Results
As predicted, and consistent with the results of Study 1, there
was a significant effect of etiological information on blame, F(3.
379) = 13.34, p < .001. Participants assigned more blame to the
agent when the cause of his disorder was genetic rather than
environmental (genes vs. abuse, p = .004, d = .49: genes vs.
accident, p < .001, d = .55): but the difference between environmental conditions was not significant (abuse vs. accident, p =
.88)." As predicted, the addition of etiological information significantly reduced the attribution of blame in both environmental
conditions (abuse vs. control, p < .001, d = .74; accident vs.
control, p < .001, d = .77) but not in the genetic condition (genes
vs. control, p = .64). (See Table 2 for descriptive statistics.)
There was also a significant effect of etiological information on
punishment, F(3. 379) = 5.14. p = .002. As in Study 1, the agent

= .25: genes vs. control, p - .99).
With respect to other dependent variables in the study, a similar
pattern emerged. There was a significant effect of etiological information on judgments of the agent's moral responsibility for the crime.
F(3, 379) = 13.14. p < .001. the extent to which he deserved
sympathy, F(3, 380) = 15.83, p < .001, and the presence of mitigating factors in the case. F(3, 379) = 13.11, p < .001. as well as
judgments of the extent to which the agent exercised his free will, F(3,
380) = 8.49, p < .001. The effect of etiological information on ratings
of the extent to which the crime expressed the agent's true self did not
reach significance. F(3, 379) = 2.36. p = .07.
In terms of pairwise comparisons, moral responsibility exhibited
the same pattern as was detected in the case of blame. Participants
attributed more responsibility to the agent in the genetic condition
than in either of the environmental conditions (genes vs. abuse, p <
.001, d = .67: genes vs. accident, p < .001, d = .79), the environmental conditions did not differ significantly (abuse vs. accident, p =
.55), and etiological information was mitigating in the environmental
conditions only (abuse vs. control. p = .03, d = .42: accident vs.
control, p < .001, d = .56; genes vs. control, p - .50). The pattern for
sympathy was the same but with the direction of effects reversed.
Participants expressed less sympathy for the agent in the genetic
condition than in either of the environmental conditions (genes vs.
abuse, p < .001, d = .88: genes vs. accident, p < .001, d = .52), the
environmental conditions did not differ significantly (abuse vs. accident, p = .07), and the addition of etiological information increased
sympathy ratings relative to the control in both environmental conditions but not in the genetic condition (abuse vs. control, p < .001, d =
.77: accident vs. control, p = .02, d = .42; genes vs. control, p = .87).
Ratings of the extent to which the background circumstances of the
case were mitigating reflected the same pattern of contrasts observed
with ratings of sympathy (genes vs. abuse, p = .03, d = .39; genes vs.
accident, p < .(II, d = .68; abuse vs. accident, p - .1 I: abuse vs.
control, p = .006, d = .49: accident vs. control, p < .001, d = .78;
genes vs. control, p = .94).
In contrast with the results of Study I, no effect of causal
information on ratings of true selfhood was observed, F(3. 383) =
2.40, p = .07, but there was an effect of this information on free
will, F(3, 384) = 8.4, p < .001. Participants attributed more free
will in the genetic condition than in either of the environmental
conditions, but this contrast reached significance only relative to
the accident condition (genes vs. accident, p < .001, d = .58:
genes vs. abuse, p = .20). Free will ratings were slightly higher in
the abuse condition than in the accident condition, but the differ-

p

' Following data collection, participant groups were compared on all
demographic variables (age, gender. and race or ethnicity) and found to be
equivalent in those respects.
' According to Tukey's test. appropriate for three or more groups, as
here (Howell. 2013). All pairwise comparisons reported for Study 2 were
analyzed using this test.
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Table 2

Mean Judgments in Studv 2

Blame

33.30
4.26
2.41
2.08
4.41
3.81

(15.29)
(.90)
(1.13)
(1.15)
(.72)
(.92)

Abuse

Genes
6.22(l.20)
34.05 (16.91)
4.44 (.74)
2.29(1.22)
2.18 (1.22)
4.44 (.75)
3.91 (1.1!)

5.62
29.13
3.87
3.26
2.63
4.21
3.74

(1.25)
(14.05)
(.96)
(1.08)
(1.09)
(.74)
(.89)

Accident

Neurological

5.49(l.45)
26.47 (15.82)
3.69 (1.12)
2.88 (1.12)
3.01 (1.23)
3.92 (1.03)
3.54 ( 1.()4)

29.30 (16.07)
3.96 (.972)
2.75(1.16)
2.56(l.23)
4.16 (.86)
3.71 (.98)

5.90 (1.21)

Psychological
5.98

(1.33)

32.18 (15.45)
4.17 (.982)
2.66 (1.20)
2.39 (1.23)
4.33 (.83)
3.79(1.02)

Figures in parentheses are SDs.

ence did not reach significance (abuse vs. accident, p = .06). The
addition of etiological information reduced attributions of free will
relative to the control in the accident condition (accident vs.
control, p < .001, d = .55), but not otherwise (abuse vs. control,
p = .33: genes vs. control. p = .99)." With respect to ratings of
true selfhood, where no effect of etiological information was
detected, the difference between the genetic and accident conditions was the only contrast to approach significance (genes vs.
accident, p = .05: all other ps > .2).
Effects of the second, mechanistic factor-that is, whether or not
the neural basis of the agent's psychopathology was specified-were
limited. Characterizing the disorder in neurological rather than purely
psychological terms resulted in a small but significant reduction in
ratings of moral responsibility (F( I, 379) = 5.44, p = .020, d = .22)
and free will (F(l, 380) = 4.06, p = .045, d = .20). No other effects
of this manipulation were detected (blame, F( 1, 379) = .49, p = .48:
punishment, F(1, 379) = 3.34, p = .07: sympathy, F(1, 380) = .66,
p = .42: mitigation, F( , 379) = 2.25, p = .14; true self, F(1, 379) =
.74, p = .39)."

Discussion
The results of Study 2, like those of Study 1, suggest that the
perception of moral agency in psychologically impaired offenders
is sensitive to information about the causal history of their pathology. Offenders with a genetically caused impairment are likely to
be seen in a more negative light overall than offenders whose
impairment has an environmental cause, and offenders whose
disorder is characterized as genetic in origin are likely to be judged
just as harshly as agents whose disorder is not characterized in
etiological terms at all. Agents whose disorder is explained by
environmental events, on the other hand, are likely to be judged
less harshly than agents with a disorder for which no etiology is
offered. These results are broadly consistent with the Theory of
Dyadic Morality, assuming that offenders with genetic deficits are
not perceived as victims of harm. Harder to square with the theory
is the finding, also replicated from Study 1, that offenders who are
portrayed as victims of harm are not viewed less unfavorably when
the harm in question was inflicted intentionally, rather than by
accident. This is surprising, given the greater seriousness of intentional harm relative to accidental harm, and the likely effect of this
difference on perceptions of victimhood.
Compared with the results of Study 1, the effects of etiological
information on participants' judgments were more pronounced,
ranging in size from .39 to .88 (vs. .36 to .49) and averaging .59

(vs. .41). Still, few large effects (i.e., effects of magnitude .8 or
greater) were observed, suggesting again that the power of causal
explanations to influence how people perceive the agency of
criminal offenders should not be overestimated.
Moving away from the Theory of Dyadic Morality, it appears
that specifying a neurological basis for an offender's psychopathology has a modest effect on the perception of their moral
agency. Though addition of this information did moderate participants' judgments about certain aspects of agency, including moral
responsibility and free will, the effect was small in size and not
observed across the board. In particular, the manipulation had no
effect on attributions of blame or expressions of sympathy.

General Discussion
Results from the two studies presented here show that ordinary
judgments of blame, punishment, and other aspects of moral
agency are sensitive to information about the etiology of psychological impairments in criminal offenders. In line with the Theory
of Dyadic Morality, offenders whose psychopathology was because of environmental causes were seen as less deserving of
moral sanction than those whose pathology was genetic in origin;
indeed, offenders whose pathology was genetic were judged no
less negatively than offenders whose pathology was given no
etiological explanation at all. These findings are consistent with
prior studies finding no mitigation effect for genetic causal stories
on judgments of blame and punishment (Appelbaum, Scurich,
Raad, 2015: Cheung & Heine, 2015: Fuss, Dressing, & Briken,
2015; Scurich & Appelbaum, 2016). However, our results contrast
with some previous research on whether evidence of suffering
childhood abuse mitigates judgments of blame and punishment
(Appelbaum & Scurich, 2014: Stevenson, Bottoms, & Diamond,
2010). We predicted that evidence of childhood abuse would
produce greater mitigation in our studies because our vignettes,
&

Note.

Control
6.42 (.90)

Punishment
Responsibility
Sympathy
Mitigation
Free will
True self

Type of disorder

Cause of disorder

Type

judgment

.92, 1)385) = 15.42. p
. Ratings of free will predicted blame ([3
.0001). punishmsent ([3= 8.0)1. t)385) = 9.10,( p < .0001). and responsibility (3 = .58, 1(385) = 11.60. p < .0001), consistent with the possibility
that the effect of causal information on moral judgment was at least
partially mediated by judgments of whether the offender's actions were

freely willed.
" There was, however, some evidence of interaction between the mech-

anistic and causal variables (blame, F(3, 379) = 2.41. p = .07: sympathy.
F(3, 380) = 4.92, p = .002: mitigation. F(3, 379) = 2.92, p = .03: all other
Ps > .1).
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Reality is more comple. In a capital sentencing trial. the narrative of
the defendant's life historytttieht include a wsider rance of causal
factors. including other tsychiatric diaenoscs. drue or alcohol addiction, and extreme poverty. Our study leaves open whether more
complex causal stories inolving childhood suffering produce similar
mitigating effects on judgments of blame and punishment. For exanple, participants in a mock jury study of capital sentencing ftund drug
addiction to be an aggravating circuinstance (Banett. Brodsky,
Price, 2007). What about a case in which early childhood abuse
causes addiction, and addiction is a significant cause of the criminal
behavior? We suspect that the evidence of childhood abuse would still
produce a mitigating effect, assuming it was also a cause of the
addiction itself. However, further research is required for us to know.
Our findings in Study 2 about the effect of specifying a neural
mechanism for an offender's disorder also suggest further avenues for
research. Attributing aitneural basis to the disorder had only a small
mitigating effect on judgments of moral responsibility and no effect
on judgments of blame or punishment. This result contrasts to some
extent with work by Greene and Cahill (2012, who found that
psychiatric diagnostic evidence coupled with evidence from neuropsychological tests and neuroimiaging produced greater mitigating
effects with respect to punishment than psychiatric diagnostic evidence alone, at least in cases in which the defendant presented a high
risk for future dangerousness. Against this background, further investigation into the effect of neuroscientific evidence on judgments of
blame and punishment is warranted. A natural extension of our
&

unlike those used in earlier research. included details about the
abuse suffered. This prediction ssas borne out by our results.
Contrary to hypothesis. ho wever, offenders whose pathology was
caused by childhood abuse were seen as no less agentic than those
whose pathology resulted from an accident. This finding presents a
challenge to the principle of moral typecasting. assuming that offenders with a history of childhood abuse are seen as more victim-like
(hence, as less villainous) than offenders with a history of accidental
trauma. However, the result may be an experimental artifact. beeause
of the fact that the vignette in the accident condition contained noi
description of the event that caused the offender's brain injury. Participants may have tacitly assumed that some intentional agency was
involved, so that intentional harm was implicated in both cases. This
interpretation of the accident scenario Could be discouraged by adding
details to the vignette that made explicit that the hami suffered by the
offender resulted directly from a random event (e.g.. a lightning
strike). That said, taking intentional agency out of the picture entirely
may be impossible, given the human propensity for making sense of
natural phenomena in agentic terms, for example, as "acts of God"
(Gray & Wegner, 2010).
Concerning our main finding, it might be that the difference in
perceived moral agency between the genetic and environmental cases
could be given an alternative explanation, in terms of the age of onset
of the disorder. In the genetic case, the disorder emerges very early in
development, whereas in both of the environmental cases, the disorder
does not emerge until childhood. It is conceivable that this difference-a difference of developmental timing (early vs. late), rather
than a difference of moral structure (non-harm-involving vs. harminvolving)-is what gave rise to the effect observed. This alternative
explanation does not seem especially plausible, but ruling it out would
require further empirical work. In particular, the vignettes would need to
be revised in such a way that the age of onset of the disorder was invariant
across conditions. We predict that the effect of the manipulation would
persist despite such invariance, but this prediction has yet to be tested.
Our studies suggest a number of other avenues for future investigation. For one, perhaps the mitigating effects of different causal
stories could depend on the type of violence committed by a
wrongdoer. Blair, Mitchell, and Blair (2005) distinguish between
"reactive" aggression, which is produced in response to a frustrating or threatening event without any further goal. and "instrumental" aggression, which is produced to achieve a specific goal.
Perhaps a history of child abuse produces greater mitigating effects
when the crime involves reactive aggression rather than instrumental aggression, because participants would be more sympathetic to a victim of childhood abuse who failed to control his
temper than one who carefully planned a crime. Based on our
results, though, it seems unlikely that the type of aggression
matters. The homicide vignette could be interpreted as involving
either instrumental or reactive aggression, though the reactive
reading seems more natural. The robbery vignette in Study 1, on
the other hand, clearly involves instrumental aggression, yet it
produced similar results with respect to the different causal stories.
Nonetheless, determining whether the mitigating effects of the
different causal stories would be affected by the type of violence
committed by the perpetrator would require further testing.
Another limitation of our studies is that the causal stories in our
vignettes were relatively simple. In each case, the criminal behavior of
the protagonist was explained by a diminished capacity for empathy
and moral judgment caused by defective genes or childhood trauma.

2

project. for example, would be to add to the design of Study 2 an
additional level of the mechanistic factor that included neuroimaging
evidence. Given Greene and Cahill's (2012) findings, presenting
participants with evidence of this sort might very well influence their
judgments of blame and punishment.
As far as the broader significance of our findings is concerned, we
note three areas of potential impact: psychology, philosophy, and the
law. In closing, we briefly consider each of these areas in turn.
First, it appears that in cases of antisocial behavior associated with
psychopathology, the perception of moral agency is sensitive to considerations of the causal history of the pathology. In particular, explaining the pathology as the result of environmental events, such as
childhood abuse, tends to reduce judgments of blameworthiness,
appropriate punishment, moral responsibility, and the like: explaining
the pathology in genetic teens, however, has no such effect. The fact
that moral perception appears sensitive to etiological information in
this way lends indirect support to the principle of moral typecasting,
a central tenet of the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Gray & Wegner,
2009, 2010, 2011). As such, our findings provide further partial
confirmation of that theory. They also demonstrate its utility as a tool
for illuminating the source of ordinary judgments about blame and
punishment in the legal context.
Second, for philosophers engaged in debates about free will and
moral responsibility, our results present something of a puzzle for
compatibilists and inconpatibilists alike. For the incompatibilist,
environmental causes should seem to mitigate responsibility, as
these are factors beyond the agent's control. However, this effect
does not generalize. Genetic causes are not seen as having a
mitigating effect, despite the fact that causes of this sort are no
more within the agent's control than environmental causes are.
Therefore, the incompatibilist's beachhead may not be very robust.
Compatibilists have the opposite problem. Whereas incompatibilists need to account for the intuition that genetic explanations do
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not diminish responsibility, compatibilists need to account for the
intuition that environmental explanations do have a mitigating
effect. The challenge facing both incompatibilists and compatibilists, then, is to explain why ordinary judgments about responsibility vary across etiological contexts.
Third, our findings are relevant to the practice of law, particularly
in capital cases. It is important not to exaggerate the practical significance of the results reported here, however, especially given the fact
that our participants were recruited from MTurk, and MTurk workers
as a group are not perfectly representative of the communities from
which jurors are drawn (Ross et al., 2010). That said, our research
does suggest that consistent with Gray and Wegner's (2011 ) contention that one way to escape blame is to be a victim, evidence of
environmental etiology may be effective for the defense when the
etiology of the disorder underlying the defendant's wrongdoing implicates victimhood. Evidence of genetic etiology is a different story.
Because genetic behavioral evidence is unlikely to reduce judgments
of blame and responsibility, time and resources should be directed
toward other strategies, especially if genetic behavioral evidence
suggests future dangerousness.

Appelbaum. P. S.. & Scurich. N. (2014). Impact of behavioral genetic
evidence on the adjudication of criminal behavior. Journalof the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. 42, 91-100.
Appelhaum, P. S.. Scurich. N.. & Raad. R. (2015). Effects of behavioral
genetic evidence on perceptions of criminal responsibility and appropriate punishment. Psvchology, Public Policy, and Lan, 21, 1 34-144.

&

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000039
Aspinwall, L. G., Brown, T. R.. & Tabery, J. (2012). The double-edged
sword: Does biomechanism increase or decrease judges' sentencing of
psychopaths? Science, 337, 846-849. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science
.1219569
Barnett, M. E.. Brodsky, S. L., & Davis. C. M. (2004). When mitigation
evidence makes a difference: Effects of psychological mitigating evidence on sentencing decisions in capital trials. Behavioral Sciences
the Law, 22. 751-770. http://dx.doi.org/l0.1002/bsl.591
Barnett, M. E.. Brodsky. S. L., & Pricc, J. R. (2007). Differential impact of
mitigating evidence in capital case sentencing. Journal of Forensic
http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/JI58v

Blair, R. J. R., Mitchell, D., & Blair, K. (2005). The psychopath: Emotion
and the

brain. Malden,

MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Buhrmester. M., Kwang. T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6. 3-5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1 177/
1745691610393980
Cheung. B. Y., & Heine, S. J. (2015). The double-edged sword of genetic

accounts of criminality: Causal attributions from genetic ascriptions
affect legal decision making. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41, 1723-1738. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167215610520
Fuss,

J.,

Dressing, H., & Briken, P. (2015). Neurogenetic evidence in the

courtroom: A randomised controlled trial with German judges. Journal
of Medical Genetics, 52, 730-737. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jmedgenet2015-103284

view,. 14, 7-16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868309350299
Gray. K., & Wegner, D. M. (2011). To escape blame, don't be a hero-Be
a victim. Journal of Experimental Social Psvchologv, 47, 516-519.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.12.012
Gray. K., Young, L.. & Waytz, A. (2012). Mind perception is the essence
of morality. Psychological Inquir, 23, 101-124. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1080/1047840X.2012.651387
Greene. E., & Cahill, B. S. (2012). Effects of neuroimaging evidence on
mock juror decision making. Behavioral Sciences & the Law. 30, 280-

296. http://dx.doi.org/10.l002/bsl.1993
Gross. J. (1990, March 31). California execution stayed: State is appealing
to high court. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.
com
Howell, D. C. (2013). Fundamentalstatistics for the behavioral sciences
(8th ed.). Boston, MA: Cengage Learning.

Meyer-Lindenberg, A., Buckholtz,

J.

W., Kolachana, B. R., Hariri, A.,

Pezawas, L., Blasi, G.....
Weinberger, D. R. (2006). Neural mechanisms of genetic risk for impulsivity and violence in humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of

America, 103, 6269-6274. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0511311103

References

Psychology Practice, 7, 39-45.
07n0 _04

Gray. K., & Wegner, D. M. (2009). Moral typecasting: Divergent perceptions of moral agents and moral patients. Journal of Personality and
Social Psvchology, 96, 505-520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0013748
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). Blaming God for our pain: Human
suffering and the divine mind. Personality and Social Psychology Re-

Monterosso, J., Royzman, E. B., & Schwartz, B. (2005). Explaining away
responsibility: Effects of scientific explanation on perceived culpability.
Ethics & Behavior, 15, 139-158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/sl532

7019eb1502_4
Moore. M. S. (1997). Placing blame: A general theorv of criminal law.
Oxford: New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Newman. G. E., Bloom, P., & Knobe,

J.

(2014). Value judgments and the

true self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40, 203-216.

http://dx.doi.org/l0.1177/01 46167213508791
Ross. J., Irani, I., Silberman, M. S., Zaldivar, A., & Tomlinson, B. (2010).
Who are the crowdworkers? Shifting demographics in Amazon Mechanical Turk. CHI EA, 2863-2872. http://dx.doi.org/10.l1145/1753846
.1753873
Sandys, M., Pruss, H. C., & Walsh, S. M. (2009). Aggravation and
mitigation: Findings and implications. Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 37,

189-236. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009318530903700204
Schein. C.. & Gray, K. (2017). The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing moral judgment by redefining harm. Personality and Social Psschologv Review. Advance online publication.
Scurich, N., & Appelbaum, P. (2016). The blunt-edged sword: Genetic
explanations of misbehavior neither mitigate nor aggravate punishment.
Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 3, 140-157. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1093/jlb/sv053
Stevenson, M. C., Bottoms, B. L.. & Diamond, S. (2010). Jurors' discus-

sions of a defendant's history of child abuse and alcohol abuse in capital
sentencing deliberations. Psychologv, Public Policy, and Law. 16, 1-38.
http://dx.doi.org/i 0.1037/a0018404
Tetterton, V. S.. & Brodsky, S. L. (2007). More is sometimes better:
Increased mitigating evidence and sentencing leniency. Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 7, 79-85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/

Jl58v07n03_05
Tiihonen, J., Rautiainen, M. R., Ollila, H. M., Repo-Tiihonen, E., VirkPaunio, T. (2015). Genetic background of
kunen, M., Palotie, A., ...
extreme violent behavior. Molecular Psyschiatry, 20, 786-792. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1038/mp.2014.130

CRIME. PUNISHMENT, AND CAUSATION

127

Appendix
Vignettes and Probe Questions for Studies 1 and 2
Genetic Condition
Brian does not feel any concern for other people. Though he was
raised in a good home with loving, affectionate parents, Brian was
never emotionally attached to them or anyone else, even as a toddler.
As he got older, lie lied to his fouily and friends repeatedly, vet he
never felt embarrassment when caught in one of his lies. He developed a cold demeanor and frequently got into tights. Starting when he
was a teenager, he committed many crimes, never feeling any guilt or
remorse.
Functional brain imaging and other neurological tests of Brian
showed abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex and other areas of
the brain associated with empathy and moral judgment. These
brain abnormalities were probably genetic in origin.

Functional brain imaging and other neurological tests of Brian
showed abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex and other areas of
the brain associated with empathy and moral judgment.

Control Without Neuromechanism (Study 2 Only)
Brian does not feel any concern for other people. Starting when
he was a teenager, he committed many crimes, never feeling any
guilt or remorse.
Psychological tests of Brian showed impairments of empathy
and moral judgment.

Questions for Study 1
Abuse Condition
Brian does not feel any concern for other people. He was a normal,
sweet child who craved affection from his parents. However, Brian
suffered severe physical and emotional abuse throughout childhood.
His drug-addicted parents whipped him daily with a tree branch.
They would lock him in his room for days at a time and the/i beat him
for urinating on the floor. To survive, he ran away from home and
learned to fend for himself on the streets. He developed a cold
demeanor and frequently got into fights. Starting when he was a
teenager, he committed many crimes, never feeling any guilt or

remorse.
Functional brain imaging and other neurological tests of Brian
showed abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex and other areas of
the brain associated with empathy and moral judgment. These
brain abnormalities were probably caused by the abuse Brian
suffered as a child.

Accident Condition
Brian does not feel any concern for other people. A freak accident
in his childhood left him with a traumatic brain injury. After the
accident, he become emotionally detached from evervone around him.
As he got older, he lied to his family and friends repeatedly, yet he
never felt embarrassment when caught in one of his lies. He developed a cold demeanor and frequently got into fights. Starting when he
was a teenager, he committed many crimes, never feeling any guilt or
remorse.
Functional brain imaging and other neurological tests of Brian
showed abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex and other areas of the
brain associated with empathy and moral judgment. These brain
abnormalities were probably caused by the injury Brian suffered as a
result of his accident.

" How much blame does Brian deserve for robbing the bank
[killing the clerk]? (I = no blame at all, 7 = a lot of blame)
- What prison sentence does Brian deserve for robbing the
bank [killing the Clerk]? (0-50 years)
" When Brian robbed the bank (killed the clerk], he was acting
of his own free will. (I = disagree strongly, 7 = agree
strongly)
- When Brian robbed the bank [killed the clerk], his behavior
was an expression of his true self-it reflected the deepest,
most essential aspects of his personality. (1 = disagree
strongly, 5 = agree strongly)

Questions for Study 2
" How much blame does Brian deserve for killing the clerk?
(I = no blame at all, 7 = a lot of blame)
" How many years in prison does brain deserve for killing
the clerk? (0-50 years)
" Brian bears full moral responsibility for his crime. (I =
strongh disagree, 5 = strongly agree)
" Even though he committed a serious crime, Brian deserves
some sympathy. (I = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree)
" The facts of Brian's case reduce his blameworthiness to some
extent. (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree)
" When Brian killed the clerk, he was acting of his own free
will. (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly)
" When Brian killed the clerk, his behavior was an expression
of his true self-it reflected the deepest, most essential aspects of his personality. (I = disagree strongly, 5 = agree
strongly)

Control With Neuromechanism (Study 2 Only)
Brian does not feel any concern for other people. Starting when
he was a teenager, he committed many crimes, never feeling any
guilt or remorse.
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